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Outsourcing is difficult to define and trickier to measure. Despite transparency and 
procurement requirements, there are no comprehensive datasets detailing the extent to 
which English councils have contracted-out service provision. This lack of information, 
coupled with austerity pressures, has probably increased the number of ‘known 
unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’ about the efficacy of this service delivery model. 
Such developments have significant implications for accountability, risk management 
and policymaking. 
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Practitioner ‘box’: 
We do not know enough about the extent of public service outsourcing: it is difficult to 
define and measure, and the datasets that exist are quite limited. Austerity cuts to back 
office functions probably mean that we know even less about it than before, at a time 
when major outsourcing companies are experiencing serious financial problems. Public 
bodies need to create a more detailed picture of their contractual relationships in order 
to inform future policymaking, hold suppliers to account effectively, and ensure that 
finances and services can be put on a sustainable footing in the event of collapse. 
 
Introduction 
Studies have shown that local authorities across the developed world are more likely to 
engage in outsourcing during times of fiscal constraint, as organizations adopt new 
delivery models in search of efficiency savings (Bel & Fageda, 2007; 2017). Therefore, 
we might expect austerity pressures since the 2008 financial crisis to have led to an 
increase in public service contracting. This is particularly the case in English local 
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government, which experienced central funding reductions of 49% between 2010 and 
2018 (National Audit Office, 2018). In addition, policy documents such as the 2011 and 
2013 Open Public Services White Papers encouraged public bodies to transfer 
responsibilities to social enterprises, non-profit organizations and private companies, 
ostensibly to increase ‘choice’ for citizens that would help to drive up service 
improvements and cost savings (Eckersley et al., 2014). 
However, a number of factors may have led to public bodies becoming increasingly 
reluctant to embrace outsourcing; indeed, some studies have identified a recent trend 
towards insourcing (Wollmann, 2018). These factors include longstanding concerns 
about the degree of control that contracting authorities can exert over external 
providers, as well as the inflexibility built into long-term contracts that prevent councils 
from changing service models or ‘recycling’ efficiency savings into other areas (Glennon, 
2017). There is also a possibility that austerity-induced resource constraints within public 
bodies could mean that managers know less about specific outsourcing arrangements, 
which would reduce their ability to manage and mitigate contractual risks (Ferry & 
Eckersley, 2019).  
In the UK specifically, the collapse of high-profile contractors such as Southern Cross 
and Carillion, together with more recent concerns about the financial viability of Capita 
and Interserve, have contributed to outsourcing becoming an increasingly controversial 
and politicized issue (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2018; 
Greasley, 2018; Plimmer, 2018). Underpinning these concerns are issues of risk transfer 
and accountability, which could lead to contracting authorities and the public suffering if 
suppliers perform poorly or experience financial difficulties. 
With these factors in mind, this paper examines what we know about outsourcing in 
English councils, .  and finds that only limited information is available about the nature 
and extent of local authority contracting. Indeed, comprehensive and robust datasets 
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simply do not exist – a finding that has significant implications for decision-making, 
evaluation and accountability in local public services. 
The next section discusses what we mean by outsourcing and highlights how it is 
something of a contested concept. We follow this by discussing some of the literature on 
private sector involvement in public services, before setting out the context for English 
local government contracting and explain how we sought to gather data on recent trends 
in this area. This feeds into a discussion about how a growth in outsourcing, coupled with 
austerity pressures, is likely to mean that policymaking and scrutiny officers will have 
recourse to less information about the efficacy of potential service models, policy 
solutions and the activities of contractors. We then conclude by setting out the 
implications of our findings for practice and future research in the fields of accountability, 
outsourcing, local government and public policy.  
Defining public services outsourcing 
Despite being mentioned frequently in discussions around public management and 
policy, outsourcing is not easy to define or measure. Scholars who have sought to define 
the concept do not interpret it consistently – both in terms of what is being outsourced 
and to whom (Harland et al, 2005). For example, Walker et al. (2005, 96) view 
outsourcing as ‘the “contracting-out” of services that were previously performed in-
house by an organization’. However, Gilley and Rasheed (2000, 765) extend the concept 
to include goods, as well as any new functions or commodities that an organization has 
the in-house capacity to produce or deliver but chooses to procure from an external 
supplier. Minicucci and Donahue (2004, 489) define it more simply as ‘the private 
delivery of government-funded services’, yet Cordella and Willcocks (2010, 83) argue 
that the term should apply to ‘the contracting out of… services/activities to [any] third 
party management… on short or long term contracts’, (our emphasis in each case). As 
this suggests, scholars are likely to disagree as to whether a particular case represents 
outsourcing, depending on the type of supplier, whether the state used to have 
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responsibility for the service or activity, the terms of the contract and the nature of what 
is being purchased.  
Perhaps reflecting this lack of clarity, outsourcing is often lumped together with concepts 
such as privatization, commissioning, procurement, public-private partnerships and the 
private finance initiative in political and media debate. High-level assessments of the 
extent of public sector contracting do not always help to clarify the issue: they usually 
focus on figures such as the amount of money that government spends every year on 
external suppliers, and the percentage of total expenditure that this figure represents 
(see, for example, Davies et al., 2018). Yet public bodies have always paid suppliers for 
a range of goods (for example, weapons, stationery, vehicles, furniture, catering or 
ICTs) and contracted external companies to build roads or undertake other construction 
projects (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2018). Such 
transactions would appear as external spending in the organization’s accounts, but most 
people would not class them as ‘outsourcing’ – because they do not refer to the provision 
of services.  
However, even if we exclude goods provision and construction from our definition, 
organizations will still rely on outside suppliers to some extent: examples from local 
government are likely to include postal services, taxis or bed and breakfast 
accommodation for homeless families. This reliance may not be codified in an official 
contract that specifies the terms and conditions of the relationship over a number of 
years, but rather take the form of the council relying on an external provider in an ad 
hoc fashion, as and when required. Some local authorities might also have a long history 
of engaging with external providers to deliver services such as local public transport, 
whereas others rely on in-house companies or resources to provide the same functions.  
Furthermore, following the recent growth of ‘shared services’, public bodies are 
themselves often suppliers – either individually in concert with others. For example, one 
local authority might provide pension, payroll or legal services on behalf of another 
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council in return for payment, or multiple organizations might establish a new, special-
purpose, agency to undertake such functions (Herbert & Seal 2009; Elston et al., 2018; 
Elston & Dixon 2019). In addition, an increasing number of English councils have 
established local authority companies or ‘corporations’ – arms-length organizations that 
deliver services on behalf of public authorities, sometimes with a view to generating 
revenue (Ferry et al., 2018; Andrews et al., 2019). Since the public body retains 
ownership of the corporation, most experts would agree that it differs from outsourcing 
to private companies – but the existence and growth of such bodies confuses matters 
further. Should we consider such public-public arrangements as outsourcing, when many 
of the principles of the contract may be similar to public-private arrangements? And do 
contracts with the voluntary sector fall into another, separate, category?  
In a useful Public Finance article, John Tizard (2015) highlighted this confusion, and 
stressed how it could lead to misunderstandings and poorly-informed citizens. His own 
definition is worth repeating here: 
Outsourcing involves contracting public services to the business, social or 
voluntary and communities sectors with providers being rewarded based on 
outputs (and sometimes outcomes) but where policy, charges and access criteria 
usually remain with the public sector client. Contracts are time limited and can be 
cancelled (Tizard 2015). 
This suggests that shared services with other public bodies are excluded, but contracts 
with voluntary organizations do class as outsourcing. Crucially, Tizard points out that 
contracts are time-limited – and, therefore, once the contract comes to an end, the 
contracting authority can seek out another provider or bring the service back ‘in house’. 
In contrast, privatization and academy schools are ‘permanent’, because unless there is 
legislative change or the provider goes bust or walks away, the contractor cannot re-
take responsibility for the service. Outsourcing is also different from public private 
partnerships (PPPs) and the private finance initiative (PFI), because it relates primarily 
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to services: PPPs and PFI normally involve the public sector paying private companies to 
use their assets.  
Nonetheless, even with this clarity, it may be difficult to identify the extent to which 
public bodies rely on outsourcing. One reason for this is that local authorities 
increasingly purchase through shared procurement arrangements that may involve other 
councils, police forces, fire and rescue services and other public bodies. Financial 
constraints and political pressure have encouraged public bodies to engage in such 
arrangements, in the hope that aggregated spending power will result in lower prices 
and reduce the administrative costs associated with processing transactions. However, it 
is very difficult to attribute spending to individual organizations in cases where multiple 
contracting authorities engage with multiple suppliers to undertake different types of 
work. Framework agreements, through which contracting bodies agree outline conditions 
with a group of suppliers and then ‘call-off’ specific packages of work or goods, are 
similarly problematic because the price of each individual call-off will vary and may not 
be itemized separately. As a result, it is extremely difficult to calculate how much each 
organization is spending on external providers for service provision. 
Outsourcing, accountability and transparency 
Initially, much of the academic literature on public service outsourcing argued that 
contracting external suppliers (usually private companies) to deliver public services was 
a cheaper option than delivering services in-house, arguing from a public choice 
perspective that state monopolies are inherently inefficient (Savas, 1974; Kemper & 
Quigley, 1976; Stein, 1990). In addition, contracting out ‘peripheral’ functions might 
help organizations to focus on their ‘core’ activities, and the process of preparing to 
outsource could give managers a better understanding of how their services operated, 
because it requires them to identify and codify costs, objectives, performance targets 
and interdependencies with other parts of the organization (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000). 
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This information could then help the public sector client to oversee outsourced functions 
and underpin democratic accountability.  
However, more recent academic literature has questioned the validity of claims that 
outsourcing is a cheaper option (Bel & Fageda, 2007; 2017) – partly because the 
imperfect nature of public sector markets makes it very difficult to ensure fair 
competition between potential providers (Skelcher, 2005; Warner & Hefetz, 2012). 
Others have stressed that public bodies need to tailor their governance and risk 
management approach according to the function they are outsourcing, and caution that 
the more complex and dynamic the service context, the riskier any decision to contract 
out is likely to be (Farneti & Young, 2008). Some of this academic scepticism is echoed 
in the grey literature, along with concerns about whether public bodies devote sufficient 
resources to manage contracts effectively (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy, 2015), and questions around whether public bodies can measure the value 
that external suppliers might add (Davies et al., 2018).  
Outsourcing also has moral hazard implications, because governments will always need 
to assume ultimate responsibility for essential public services in the event of a private 
provider walking away or going bust (Walker & Tizard, 2018). These issues came to the 
fore in the UK with the high-profile collapse of major outsourcing companies such as 
Southern Cross (in 2011) and Carillion (in 2018), after which the state had to step in. 
Such examples highlighted how outsourcing can lead to the development of a mutually 
dependent, symbiotic relationship between the state and those companies that rely 
almost exclusively on public sector contracts – and therefore sudden changes on one 
side could have a substantial impact on the other (Greasley 2018).  
Furthermore, the complexity of outsourcing arrangements can make them difficult to 
scrutinize (Shaoul, 1997; Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003), particularly where contracts are 
subject to commercial confidentiality (Funnell, 2000; Barton, 2006).  Together with the 
fact that they often involve transferring responsibilities away from democratically-elected 
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bodies to private or voluntary organizations, this means that citizens have less oversight 
and control over how their taxes are spent and therefore has significant implications for 
public accountability. Although accountability is a contested concept (Sinclair, 1991; 
Murphy et al., 2019), a long-standing interpretation is based on principal-agent theory: 
the idea that ‘agents’ carry out activities on behalf of ‘principals’, and the latter then hold 
the former ‘to account’ for their actions (Mayston, 1993). Therefore, in order to do this 
effectively, principals need access to relevant information about how the agent is 
operating. 
Reflecting its roots in accounting, accountability initially focused on financial 
management and combatting corruption (Bovens, 2005). However, the advent of New 
Public Management approaches in Western democracies, together with the recognition 
that accounting practices focused too much on organizational costs at the expense of 
operational performance (Hopwood, 1984), led governments to extend these principles 
of quantification and measurement to organizational strategy (Perrin, 1998). As such, 
officials developed target-based frameworks to try to assess the extent to which public 
bodies were achieving policy objectives (Boyne & Chen, 2006). These principles also 
apply to outsourcing arrangements, on the basis that performance management 
approaches can provide public bodies (the ‘principals’ in the accountability relationship) 
with some insights into how the contractor (the ‘agent’) operates – and hold them to 
account accordingly. More recent scholarship has also stressed the importance of the 
‘forward-looking’ aspects of accountability – the potential to use performance and 
financial data to learn from experience and improve service delivery and governance in 
the future (Murphy et al., 2019).  
As this suggests, the information that principals can access about the activities of agents 
shapes the effectiveness of accountability arrangements – whether this relates to 
external contracting or in-house provision. Within a UK local authority context, we might 
expect officers and elected members who are responsible for scrutiny to undertake the 
role of principals – and therefore they will need access to data that will help them to 
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judge the extent to which providers meet the required standards. Crucially, however, 
factors such as the type of data that are available, the way in which they are presented 
and the skills and resources of those who need to process and analyse them will 
influence whether principals can undertake their task effectively (O’Neill, 2006; Ferry et 
al., 2015). Some have also pointed out that the complex nature of public services makes 
it impossible to fully comprehend how individuals and organizations contribute towards 
achieving desired outcomes (Byrne & Callaghan, 2013; Lowe, 2013; Lowe & Wilson, 
2015). Since tactics such as ‘gaming’ performance targets can also distort the picture of 
how public services are operating (Hood, 2006), these factors suggest that we should 
not rely too heavily on numerical data to hold officers, politicians and service providers 
to account. 
Nonetheless, public bodies use this information to try to monitor service quality, 
regardless of the identity of the provider. In cases where services are delivered by 
external suppliers, they might have nothing else upon which to base their judgements 
about how a service operates – and, crucially, they may need to rely on the contractor to 
provide these data (Schwab et al., 2017). If relevant and comprehensive information is 
not forthcoming, or the principal lack the necessary legal powers to enforce sanctions for 
non-compliance, this would harm accountability. Furthermore, if a local authority has 
outsourced some services, and the contract straddles electoral cycles, voting becomes a 
less meaningful exercise, because a change in the political control of the council is 
unlikely to affect the outsourcing contract and therefore how services are delivered 
(Chakrabortty, 2014). 
Context for outsourcing in English local government 
Outsourcing in English local government became more widespread after the introduction 
of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Seal, 1999), which required councils “to assess 
whether their services could be delivered more cheaply by private providers and, if this 
proved to be the case, they had to be put out to tender” (Eckersley et al., 2014, 534). 
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This led many authorities to contract out provision of services such as waste collection, 
school meals provision, grounds maintenance and housing repairs – and these blue-
collar functions were joined later by white-collar departments such as payroll, human 
resources, benefits administration and customer contact.  
More recently, central government reduced its funding to councils by 49 per cent 
between 2010 and 2018 (National Audit Office, 2018), and ministers have expressed 
their preference for ‘open public services’ (to quote the title of the 2011 and 2013 White 
Papers) in which different providers compete more intensively for public contracts. These 
pressures have increased the likelihood that councils will rely more on external providers 
in order to try and save money, notwithstanding the apparent drawbacks of such a 
model (Tizard & Walker, 2018). At the same time, the UK Government’s decisions to 
abolish the Audit Commission and performance management frameworks have reduced 
the level of public oversight into how councils are operating, along with the quantity and 
quality of reports into local policy initiatives and management approaches (Eckersley et 
al., 2014; National Audit Office 2014; 2018; Ferry & Eckersley, 2019). Although the 
Audit Commission’s performance improvement function was replaced by a ‘sector-led’ 
approach facilitated through the Local Government Association (Murphy & Jones, 2016), 
these changes have reduced the visibility of the impact of austerity within local 
government and enabled ministers to avoid the blame for potentially unpopular decisions 
(Ferry & Eckersley, 2015). 
Furthermore, the funding reductions may also have had a less obvious impact in terms 
of holding public service providers to account: local government cuts were implemented 
disproportionately in ‘back-office’ administrative functions such as policy development, 
performance monitoring and management – rather than those services that interact with 
citizens at the ‘front-line’ (Hastings et al., 2015). This is likely to reduce capacity within 
local authorities to (a) monitor service provision and hold agents to account and (b) 
develop detailed analyses of the efficacy of different policy options – including the choice 
of delivery model (Eckersley & Tobin, 2019).  
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In other words, we might expect the ‘boundaries of rationality’ (Simon, 1972) for both 
principals and policymakers to have diminished over this period, due to a decrease in the 
availability of relevant information. This increase in the number of ‘known unknowns’ 
and ‘unknown unknowns’ would mean that public bodies are less able to weigh up the 
potential benefits, risks and drawbacks of different options (Ferry and Eckersley, 2019), 
and less well-equipped to monitor providers and hold them to account subsequently. 
Although such developments would also apply to service delivery options other than 
outsourcing, the additional concerns associated with external contracting would increase 
concerns around accountability, transparency, value for money and public assurance 
over the medium and longer-term.  
Method 
With these factors mind, we sought to identify the scope and scale of English local 
government outsourcing, and then consider their implications for public accountability. 
We conducted a comprehensive internet search to try and gather some of this 
information, including visiting the websites of the Chartered Institute for Public Finance 
and Accountancy (CIPFA), the Ministry for Communities, Housing and Local Government 
(MHCLG), HM Treasury, the House of Commons, the Local Government Association 
(LGA), local authorities, voluntary organizations, think tanks, media sources, 
representatives of the outsourcing industry and independent consultants. We also held 
broader discussions on the subject of local service delivery models with a total of fifteen 
people in person. These individuals worked for CIPFA, MHCLG, the LGA, two different 
local authorities, a voluntary sector provider, the House of Commons, a think tank and 
two private companies that provide public bodies with outsourcing advice. After it 
became clear that numerous datasets existed related to government purchasing and 
contracting, but they were each limited in different ways, we approached two companies 
that harvest the details of public tenders and contracts and then re-purpose and sell 
these data to contractors for market intelligence purposes. We purchased a database 
from one company, which included details of every tender advertised by a public body on 
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the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED, the online version of the Official Journal of the 
European Union that features all EU procurement notices, https://ted.europa.eu) and UK 
Government Contracts Finder (www.gov.uk/contracts-finder) websites between January 
2012 and August 2018. This comprised over 120 000 lines of data relating solely to local 
authorities in the UK, and we endeavoured to draw upon this for our analysis.  
(Lack of) findings and discussion 
However, our approach encountered various difficulties, largely because the data we 
were able to find were not tailored for our study, and trying to re-purpose them to 
support our investigation was extremely challenging. Many government datasets (such 
as that held by HM Treasury) relate to the entire public sector rather than specifically 
local government, and are also not sufficiently fine-grained to distinguish between 
different types of spending. Although every local authority has to submit its accounts to 
central government and auditors on an annual basis, these are organized according to 
relatively high-level budget headings that largely correspond to council directorates. 
They do not indicate how much money is spent on in-house operations – and, by 
extension, they also do not provide any information about contracting. Despite the fact 
that CIPFA collects numerous financial datasets, none of these relate to outsourcing – 
and the LGA does not hold this information either.  
Furthermore, the datasets that do exist are not designed for the purposes of scrutinizing 
public expenditure. Instead, they are organized according to the needs of government 
departments and suppliers (who want to find contracts that fit their expertise) and 
usually only contain a short description about what the contract entails. As Davies et al. 
(2018, p.11) highlighted in their recent report into government-wide procurement, the 
nature of these data mean that “the best available method for identifying what 
government is buying is to use the identity of the supplier to take an educated guess”. 
Indeed, figures that attempt to convey the scale of the ‘public services industry’ that 
feature in official reports and the grey literature (such as Julius, 2008; National Audit 
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Office, 2017) are based on estimates rather than robust datasets, and may also relate to 
overall public spending (i.e. include the cost of supplies and works) rather than just 
services. We should therefore treat them with caution.  
Another potential avenue for obtaining relevant data relates to the transparency 
requirements that came into effect in 2011 to replace performance auditing. These mean 
that public bodies have to publish the details of all spending valued above £500 online (a 
figure that was later reduced to £250). These requirements have led to a large increase 
in the availability of procurement information, but the sheer volume of spending now 
means that these data are difficult to collate and dissect, and each public body stores 
them on its own website: they are not aggregated in a single place. Similarly, public 
bodies are required to publish all tenders that are valued above the EU procurement 
thresholds (£221,000 for services) on the government’s Contracts Finder system since 
2015. Yet, although these data are publicly available, they are not designed for scrutiny 
or accountability purposes and the system does not match tenders with subsequent 
contract awards.  
There are also limitations associated with the market intelligence dataset that we 
purchased, because it is not designed for the purposes of analysing  which public 
services are more likely to be outsourced. A key reason for this is that the dataset is 
structured according to the EU’s Common Procurement Vocabulary, which ensures that 
all procurement notices issued by public bodies in the EU that are valued above certain 
thresholds are grouped into a hierarchy of categories. Although this hierarchy does help 
to isolate and examine specific types of contracts, it is organized according the tasks 
that need to be carried out (such as management consulting, software development, or 
vehicle maintenance services), rather than the departmental structures that shape local 
government budgets (for example, social care, waste collection, highways, or leisure 
services). The sheer size of the dataset means that it would be extremely difficult and 
time-consuming to isolate and analyse individual lines of data to identify which local 
authority service is seeking to contract out specific activities. 
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Furthermore, these datasets are often incomplete: according to Davies et al. (2018), 
only 30% of local government contracts were published on Contracts Finder. Although 
the missing lines of data are more likely to relate to small one-off purchases rather than 
longer-term outsourcing arrangements, many of those that do exist do not include basic 
information such as the value or length of the contract. This means we are unable to 
calculate the percentage of a council’s budget that is devoted to external spending – 
unless we were to approach each authority individually and ask for this information 
directly for each separate contract. Given the enormous number of contracts detailed in 
the dataset, and the likelihood that the contents of many agreements could be subject to 
commercial confidentiality, we felt that this exercise would not have been worthwhile.  
Although the LGA’s LG Inform service (https://lginform.local.gov.uk) does bring together 
metrics and benchmarking data into a single repository, it focuses on the extent to which 
councils perform against high-level targets. This lack of detail or granularity could help 
researchers to undertake quantitative studies or a macro-level assessment of local public 
service performance. However, the datasets are insufficient for qualitative auditing or 
evaluation purposes – as well as for practitioners and scholars of accountancy, public 
policy or performance management who wish to understand why an organization might 
be achieving a particular score against any specific metric. Therefore, even if we take 
these quantitative data at face value, they are of limited assistance in helping local 
authorities to decide whether to outsource, scrutinise contractors or develop strategies 
for improvement.  
Despite our attempts, therefore, we were unable to find comprehensive details about the 
contracts that councils agree with external providers. Together with uncertain definitions 
about what outsourcing actually entails, this meant that we could not paint a satisfactory 
picture of its prevalence and potential growth in English local government – nor the 
factors that might contribute towards some organizations relying more heavily on 
contractors than others. As a result, policymakers, principals and the wider public are 
largely in the dark about the extent to which councils undertake outsourcing, why they 
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opt for this particular service model, their exposure to systemic risks if contractors 
encounter difficulties, the degree to which suppliers are delivering value for money, and 
– ultimately – whether decisions are being made in the public interest. Given the 
financial difficulties that many contractors are currently experiencing in the UK (Plimmer, 
2018), this lack of knowledge is concerning – particularly if public bodies are relying 
more and more on private companies to deliver services. Notably, a committee of MPs 
criticized central government departments for similar reasons following the collapse of 
Carillion (Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2018). 
It is also worth considering that ‘hard’ financial data are generally seen as being easier 
to collect and more difficult to ‘game’ than ‘softer’ performance information (Hood, 
2006). As such, we probably have even less understanding of how well contractors are 
achieving desirable outcomes than we do about how much money the public sector 
spends on external providers. Given these information constraints, neither the principals 
involved in accountability relationships nor local policymakers are in a position to 
conclude that outsourcing represents ‘value for money’. Scrutiny officers can only access 
limited information about the activities of external providers, and policymakers are 
highly likely to base decisions on rules of thumb, preconceived views about ‘what works’ 
and ideological preferences – rather than robust and reliable ‘evidence’ (Cairney, 2016).  
Taking this further, recent funding cuts – particularly to ‘back-office’ administrative 
functions – are likely to mean that public bodies have even less capacity to decide which 
service model might be most appropriate, as well as to monitor performance, scrutinize 
contracting arrangements and identify their exposure to potential risks. Such a situation 
has significant implications for public accountability, because neither citizens nor their 
elected representatives have access to reliable information about how service providers 
are operating. Indeed, we can see how the boundaries of rationality – for both 
policymakers and scrutiny officers – have probably contracted over recent years. Due to 
the abolition of performance assessment and Audit Commission reports, these 
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individuals have fewer data sources upon which to draw to inform policymaking and 
accountability processes.  
Conclusions 
This study began as an attempt to identify in the scope and scale of English local 
government outsourcing, mindful of the fact that contracting-out is more common during 
periods of fiscal constraint. However, we found that outsourcing was difficult to define, 
the datasets related to public service contracting are limited and the analytical capability 
to make sense of this information is constrained. As such, we were unable to make a 
reliable assessment of developments in local government outsourcing in recent years. 
Yet, these issues were revealing in and of themselves: they highlighted that public 
bodies will only be able to obtain a very limited picture of how local services are 
operating, particularly outside their own authorities. Previous research into policymaking 
in the ‘real world’ have pointed out that public servants are not normally able to take 
highly-informed decisions based on ‘evidence’, due to the complex nature of public 
services and the fast-moving environment within which they operate (Cairney, 2016). 
We concur with this view, but would also go further by emphasising that austerity cuts 
and commercial confidentiality considerations are likely to have exacerbated this 
situation, because the number of ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’ are 
probably increasing.  Public bodies now have fewer resources to evaluate and make 
sense of public service activity - something that applies not just to outsourcing as a 
service delivery model, but also other options, including corporatization, shared services 
and insourcing. As a result, we can see how the boundaries of rationality for both 
policymakers and scrutiny officers are shrinking, meaning that factors such as ‘gut 
feeling’, ideological preferences and the persuasiveness of influential actors are likely to 
play a bigger role in decision-making.  
These findings have implications for policymaking and accountability within the UK and 
elsewhere, given the extent of austerity cuts in other countries (particularly in southern 
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Europe) over recent years. Where the level of resources such as time, staff and relevant 
information is falling, the quality of decision-making is likely to suffer – and therefore 
public bodies may select a service delivery option that is inappropriate for their 
purposes. Similarly, capacity constraints within the organization are likely to reduce its 
ability to monitor service delivery and hold providers (both external contractors and in-
house teams) to account. Indeed, given that external factors such as austerity and 
central government policies may be encouraging English authorities to adopt a 
patchwork of different service models, we might even ask whether councils should be the 
sole principal within local accountability relationships: should ministers and central actors 
not bear some of this responsibility as well? If such duties are not allocated clearly, there 
is a significant chance that public bodies will not manage the associated contractual risks 
effectively. 
In addition, the fact that there is no reliable estimate of the exact scale and scope of 
outsourcing in English councils raises concerns about the extent to which the public 
sector is exposed to the risk of systemic collapse. Several major contractors have 
experienced significant financial difficulties in recent years, and their symbiotic 
relationship with public bodies means that the state will probably have to step in to 
provide services if they follow the likes of Southern Cross and Carillion. Local authorities 
and other public bodies need to create a comprehensive picture of their contractual 
relationships with external organizations in order to monitor the situation and ensure 
that finances and services can be put on a sustainable footing in the event of collapse. 
We would encourage further research into conceptualising and assessing the implications 
of different public service delivery models. In particular, scholars who are interested in 
taking a case study approach to examine outsourcing practices within individual 
authorities could shed significant light on the decision-making process. This research 
could also help to identify the extent to which officers and elected members are able to 
scrutinise activity and hold suppliers to account after a contract has been agreed.  
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Practitioners could draw on such studies to inform their own decision-making, and not 
rush into outsourcing as an ‘easy solution’ to save money – there is limited evidence to 
suggest that it is always a cheaper option, and it can involve substantial trade-offs in 
control and accountability. It may also be the case that greater focus on the qualitative 
aspects of service delivery that are difficult to measure, rather than concentrating on 
cost and performance metrics within a contract, could result in better outcomes. Such 
issues are not exclusive to the decision to outsource: they are also relevant for other 
models of service delivery, such as shared services, corporatization, joint ventures and 
insourcing – both in the UK and elsewhere. 
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